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Abstract This paper offers a critical overview and assessment of North’s work on
institutions and economic change, focusing on aspects of his work that are of
interest to law and development scholars. It examines North’s approach to institu-
tions through his historical work focusing on his concept of credible commitment
and his interpretation of the effect of the Glorious Revolution on property rights,
focusing especially on the role he assigns to property rights in bringing about the
Industrial Revolution. The paper also examines North’s theory of institutions
focusing on three main issues: the pervasive influence of the principles of neo-
classical economics; the focus on an end-point model based on successful Western
economies; and the failure adequately to account for the role of organizations in the
process of change. Finally, the paper discusses the role of law in North’s theory. The
objective of this section of the paper is to clarify whether law, according to North is
a protagonist in the process of institutional change or is merely a by-product of
changes taking place elsewhere in society.
Keywords Law and development  Institutions  New institutional economics 
Political development
1 Introduction
Over the past four decades an influential group of economists – known under the
label New Institutional Economics (NIE) – have focused their attention on the role
of institutions. While their research centres mainly on issues relating to developed
market economies, some of them have devoted their attention to the study of the role
of institutions in economic growth. Douglass North (1920–2015), an economic
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historian who in 1993 won the Nobel Memorial Prize in Economics, was one the
most prominent member of this group.1
North had a major impact on contemporary development thinking. His work was the
single most important source of inspiration that led development agencies in the early
1990s to shift their attention from technical economic issues towards broader institutional
concerns. This shift, reflected in the World Bank’s motto ‘institutions matter’, brought
about a substantial increase in the resources that international development agencies
allocate to legal and institutional reform. But it is as a scholar that North had the most
profound and lasting impact. His work is highly respected by economists and is hugely
influential among political scientists, historians and sociologists. The impact of his work
among academics from a wide range of disciplines is a reflection of his broad
interdisciplinary perspective, which spans, with rigour and erudition, a range of
disciplines. Regrettably, however, with few exceptions,2 legal scholars interested in law
and development and socio-legal studies have largely ignored his work.
The indifference of law and development scholars to North’s work is unjustified.
Indeed, his work addresses issues and offers explanations and insights to questions
that have long been on their research agenda. Although North did not purport to
offer simple solutions to longstanding questions about economic growth, his work
deserves attention because it attempts to explain the role of institutions, including
law, in the process of economic change. In particular, his work should be of interest
to lawyers because it addresses many questions that figure prominently on the
research agendas of legal scholars, including the following: How does sustained
institutional change occur and what role, if any, does law play in this process? What
is the relationship between political and legal processes? Why do some countries
find it so difficult to establish stable institutions to protect property rights and
enforce contracts? What is the relationship between legitimacy and efficiency?
What role do culture and ideology play in institutional development? Why are
formal laws often ineffective? Are some legal systems more economically efficient
than others? Does the enactment of modern constitutions make a difference to
political and economic processes? Although North’s answers to these questions was
coloured by his distinctive economic approach, they provide law and development
and socio-legal scholars with valuable material for reflection.
Since North’s work is so obviously relevant to the research interests of law and
development and socio-legal scholars, why has it been ignored? There are, of
course, no sound academic reasons to explain this. Perhaps the neglect is due to the
fact that North was identified, albeit mistakenly, as an advocate of the controversial
Washington Consensus and, as a consequence, regarded as politically biased by
critics of neo- liberal policies. Such a view is unfair because it fails to take into
account that he was a sharp critic of the simplistic advice promoted by World Bank
economists, who believe that all that is needed to resolve the problem of growth is to
get the prices right. North’s theory of institutions was precisely designed to show
1 On NIE see, p. Alston (2008); Eggertsson (1990); Field (1999); Furubotn and Richter (2005); Me´nard
and Shirley (2005); Me´nard and Shirley (2012); Mercuro and Medema (2006, pp. 241–283); Rutherford
(1994).
2 Dam (2006); Thomas (2011); Trebilcock and Daniels (2008).
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that this approach was misguided. Nevertheless, the view that he is an unconditional
supporter of the Washington Consensus is not easy to rebut because the Bank – for
reasons that even North might not have entirely comprehended – selectively
embraced some of his ideas, in particular his definition of institutions as rules of the
game and his argument that sustained growth is not possible without appropriate
institutions.3
North’s work undoubtedly poses serious challenges to the non-specialist reader.
Since his main concern was to persuade other economists about the limitations of
economic models that take institutions for granted, lawyers are unlikely to find his
work relevant. Also, his work is not immediately accessible, as it is dispersed in
numerous publications spanning a period of several decades. Over the years he
modified and refined some of his theoretical positions. As a result, understanding
and summarising his theory on institutions is not a simple task.4 Moreover, as this
paper shows, on some crucial points, his position was sometimes vague, often
evasive or not fully developed. Although, in general, he presented his ideas clearly,
his writing was perhaps too succinct. As a result, his readers frequently find
themselves wishing he had offered a fuller explanation of his theoretical concepts or
provided a more detailed discussion of his historical illustrations. His most
ambitious and successful book, Institutions, Institutional Change, and Economic
Performance (1990), which presents a general theory about institutions, is only 152
pages long so, unsurprisingly, the book can hardly offer in-depth analysis of all the
issues. According to Alexander Field, some ambiguities in North’s work stemmed
from his determined efforts to present a theory that was sufficiently eclectic to draw
into his camp a wide range of scholars and perspectives.5
This paper offers a critical overview and assessment of North’s work on
institutions and economic change, focusing on aspects of his work that are of
interest to law and development scholars. The paper consists of five sections.
Section 2 examines North’s approach to institutions through his historical work. It
discusses his concept of credible commitment and focuses especially on his
interpretation of the effect of the Glorious Revolution on property rights and the role
he assigns to property rights in bringing about the Industrial Revolution. Section 3
examines North’s theory of institutions, as reflected in his major theoretical books:
Institutions, Institutional Change, and Economic Performance (1990); Understand-
ing the Process of Economic Change (2005); and Violence and Social Orders
(2009). It focuses on three related features: the pervasive influence of the principles
of neoclassical economics; the exclusive focus on an end-point model based on
successful Western economies; and the reluctance to account for the role of
organizations in the process of change. Section 4 discusses the role of law in
North’s theory. Its objective is to clarify whether, in his theory, law is a protagonist
in the process of institutional change or subordinate to economic and political
processes. The final section. Section 5, concludes and draws together some of the
points developed in the paper.
3 Kleinfeld (2012, pp. 86–87).
4 For overviews of his work, see Bates (2014); Field (2006); Greif (2008); Me´nard and Shirley (2014).
5 Field (2006, p. 425).
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2 History
North’s interest in institutions originated from his extensive work in economic
history, as apparent in his two major books on European economic history: The Rise
of the Western World – A New Economic History (1973) and Structure and Change
in Economic History (1981). The main lesson he draws from this work is that
sustained economic growth requires an efficient system of property rights so that
individuals can channel their efforts into activities that will bring private returns
close to the social rate of return. The way economies move towards achieving better
institutions is through a process of adaptive efficiency. The focus of adaptive
efficiency is on the rules that shape economic evolution over time and on the
willingness of its players to acquire knowledge and skills to develop innovative
solutions for resolving problems.6 Adaptive efficiency brings about improvements
to the overall institutional structure, but it is also conditioned by it. The test that
North proposes to determine whether an economy is moving in an adaptively
efficient direction is whether its institutions provide ‘the incentives to encourage the
development of decentralized decision-making processes that will allow societies to
maximize the efforts required to explore alternative ways of resolving problems’.7
The most important illustration of adaptive efficiency is the transition from
feudalism to capitalism, which took place in late medieval and early modern
Europe. In historical terms adaptive efficiency is incremental and consists of
cumulative changes brought about by individuals who encourage other individuals
to strive for greater productivity that eventually yields positive social change. This
was the kind of institutional transformation that brought about the prevalence of
market relations and the Industrial Revolution in Northern Europe.8
The transition in Europe occurred over a long period. It was the product of a mix
of economic and political changes that combined to produce an enduring economic
outcome. Briefly, North’s characterisation of this period is as follows.9 In the
fourteenth century, contracts between lords and peasants were altered, albeit
incrementally, as a result of the sharp decline in population, which, in turn, brought
about changes to the parties’ relative bargaining position. The nature and extent of
the alterations to these contracts were determined by transaction costs, as reflected
in the customary rules prevailing in the manor and in the parties’ perceptions about
their unequal relationship, which the parties – lords and peasants – took for granted.
Had the parties not taken for granted the unequal nature of their contractual
relationship, they would have opted for a more radical and more efficient
renegotiation. The path-dependent attribute of institutions led them towards
incremental change. In this instance, the outcome was efficient because of the
combination of competitive political forces and the slow ideological shift away from
the unequal character of the master-servant relationship. As a consequence, North
argues, feudalism was not an exploitative arrangement, but an efficient solution that
6 North (1990a, p. 80).
7 North (1990a, p. 81).
8 North (1971, p. 123).
9 North and Thomas (1971, 1973, pp. 25–32).
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contributed to reduce transaction costs in response to the needs of peasants. In his
view, the costs involved in negotiating rental agreements were so high that labour
services proved to be a more efficient alternative.10 North’s characterisation of
medieval serfdom as an efficient contractual relationship was strongly criticised.11
Arcadius Kahan noted that the depiction of serfdom as contractual was misleading
because serfdom, as an institution, was not a relationship of equality, but partial
ownership of human beings. He also noted that it was a mistake to describe as
contractual an arrangement where only one of the parties had the final say on the
nature of the relationship.12 North accepted these criticisms and in 1981 abandoned
the concept of the manorial regime as a contractual relationship, describing it
instead as a predatory relationship whereby lords extracted income from the
peasants in a manner analogous to that employed by the mafia.13 He noted, however,
that the demise of the manorial system came about because of the changing
opportunity costs of lords and peasants.14
North’s interpretation of the manorial system highlights the link between
economic and political processes, but does not purport to explain how this link
operates in contemporary societies. In general, he regards institutional change as
slow and unlikely to lead to economic growth because those who benefit from the
status quo will sabotage or strongly resist it. He also rules out a Leninist type of
revolution from above because he believes that cultural factors or, as he describes
them, informal social rules, generally tend to defeat the efforts of the most zealous
revolutionaries.15 Only institutions that promote cooperation are capable of
overcoming the elites’ vested interests. The difficulty, in his view, is that political
institutions are generally fragile and thus fail to guarantee either stability or
sustained growth. Political democracy would seem to provide the most efficient
framework because it gives access to decision-making to a large proportion of the
population and has mechanisms to keep in check rulers’ tendencies towards
arbitrary rule. Yet, democracy does not guarantee the harmonisation of political
markets. Two factors undermine democracy: the complexity of modern societies,
exacerbated by voters’ ignorance; and, the perennial principal-agent problem, which
means that political actors’ (agents) agendas are not generally consistent with the
wishes and interests of the voters (principals).16 Nevertheless, successful political
outcomes can be achieved provided the parties agree to cooperate and their
commitment is credible.17
The notion of credible commitment was one of North’s most celebrated
contributions, but its meaning is unclear. It refers mainly to the enforcement of
10 North and Thomas (1973; p. 32), (1971, p. 790/1).
11 Jones (1972); Fenoaltea (1975a, b); Field (1981); Hicks (1974); Jones (1972); Rinngrose (1973).
12 Kahan (1973, pp. 89, 91, 95).
13 North (1981, p. 130).
14 North (1981, p. 131), see also Ogilvie (2007, p. 663), Ankarloo (2002, p. 25); Milonakis and Fine
(2007, p. 47).
15 North (1979, p. 257); (1992, p. 27).
16 North (1981, pp. 25, 37); (1989, p. 1321).
17 North (1990a, p. 50).
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political arrangements, in particular, to the enforcement of property rights. In his
book The Rise of the Western World (1973), North acknowledged that had did not
properly address the issue of enforcement, although property rights were the main
focus of his argument.18 This explains why, in his recent work, he placed more
emphasis on the notion of credible commitment. He argues that credible
commitment, as reflected in gradual improvements in the enforcement of complex
contractual arrangements, explains England’s economic success. His concept of
credible commitment derives mainly from his interpretation of England’s Glorious
Revolution of 1688, which enhanced the security of property rights, thus
contributing to the country’s successful economic development and to its eventual
emergence as a leading world power.19
At the time of the Glorious Revolution, England, along with other countries in
Europe, faced the characteristic problem of having to secure reliable and steady
streams of revenue. Earlier in the century, the fiscal crisis provoked acrimonious
political exchanges that eventually led to civil war and to the overthrow and then
restoration of the monarchy. The Glorious Revolution brought this period of
instability to an end through a redesign of fiscal and governmental institutions.
According to North, the institutional settlement of 1688 had the following
features: (1) it curtailed royal prerogatives, subordinating them to the common
law; (2) it gave Parliament a dominant role in the area of taxation; (3) it created
an independent judiciary; and (4), it reaffirmed and strengthened the protection of
property rights.20 Two related factors contributed towards boosting the authority
of this settlement. Firstly, the recent removal of the previous monarch, James II,
sent a clear message to the serving monarchs, William and Mary, that the social
forces represented in Parliament were ruthless and determined to achieve their
goals. And secondly, the considerable powers retained by William and Mary
provided Parliament with a strong incentive to honour its side of the bargain.
England’s success in establishing institutions is apparent when compared with the
fate of France and Spain during the same period. While the political settlement of
1688 enabled England to thrive economically and politically, France was unable
to do so. The victory of Parliament led to the establishment of the Bank of
England and the creation of new financial instruments that reduced the costs of
transacting, enhanced the security of property rights and opened the way to a
financial revolution.21 In his General Economic History, Max Weber discusses the
politics leading to the establishment of the Bank of England. He notes, with some
surprise, that the Bank was established as a private corporation and remarks that
this institutional form was more suitable to a republic than a monarchy.22 Had
Weber been aware of North’s interpretation of the political consequences of the
Glorious Revolution, he may have come to see that the legal form selected for the
18 North (1993, p. 12).
19 North (1990a, p. 139).
20 North and Weingast (1989, p. 816).
21 North (1989, p. 1327).
22 Weber (1961 [1923], pp. 198/9, 208).
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Bank’s institutional structure was a reflection of a significant transformation of the
monarchy and political authority.23
While England successfully managed a viable political settlement, France was
unable to develop durable mechanisms for resolving its fiscal crisis. Louis XIV
resorted to temporary measures that proved ineffective and, as a consequence, by
1765 France, after losing its North American colonies, was on the verge of
bankruptcy.24 Spain fared no better.
According to North, the root cause of Spain’s relative decline and the ensuing
three centuries of stagnation were caused by a centralized bureaucracy that
hopelessly tried to control every aspect of the economy through an inordinate
number of decrees and regulations.25 North extends his comparison between
England and Spain to explain the different paths taken by their colonies in the
Americas. While England’s colonies in North America adopted inclusive political
systems, modelled on England, the Spanish colonies in the rest of the continent,
reproducing the political flaws of their mother country, became centralised states.26
North’s interpretation of the Glorious Revolution, though widely praised, has
been the subject of close scrutiny. The main issue raised concerns the accuracy of
the credible commitment/property rights/economic growth nexus. In particular,
critics examine two main issues: (1) North’s interpretation of the effect of the
Glorious Revolution on property rights; and, (2) the role he assigns to property
rights in bringing about the Industrial Revolution.
Some observers question North’s emphasis on the impact of the Glorious
Revolution on property rights. Indeed, long before the Glorious Revolution the
concept of property was invoked in England to distinguish the rights of kings from
the rights of private individuals.27 Deirdre McCloskey notes that property rights had
been respected in England for many centuries, dating back to the Magna Carta of
1215.28 While most critics agree that the Glorious Revolution brought about greater
security to some property owners, such as state creditors, not all forms of property
were equally secure. Indeed, as Martin Daunton notes, North’s argument about the
security of property rights does not take into account the massive transfer of land in
Scotland from clans to powerful landlords, the displacement of Irish landlords by
English settlers, or the restricted rights of peasants in England.29 Although, in
general, property rights in land were protected from interference by third parties or
by the government, land was expropriated for a variety of purposes, mostly
connected with public utility projects such as canals, docks and water supplies.30
According to Julian Hoppitt, the extent of these expropriations seriously undermines
23 Pincus and Robinson (2014).
24 North and Thomas (1973, pp. 121–127); North and Weingast (1989, pp. 830–831).
25 North (1971, p. 123); North and Thomas (1973, pp. 127–131); North (1990a, pp. 113, 122); (1992,
p. 21).
26 North (1990a, p. 110); (1989, pp. 1329–1330).
27 Plucknett (2010 [1956], p. 37).
28 McCloskey (2010, pp. 336–337, 343); Clark (1993, p. 875).
29 Daunton (2010, pp. 152, 155).
30 Harris (2004, p. 229).
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North’s thesis that property rights became more secure after the Glorious
Revolution. He notes, however, that it was precisely the increase in the scale of
expropriations that gave Parliament the required flexibility to take advantage of new
economic opportunities.31 Thus, economic prosperity, when it came about, was not
because of an increase in the security of property, but because of the enhanced
authority and respect of Parliament.32 Indeed, a consequence of the Glorious
Revolution was that it enhanced the government’s capacity to raise taxes and,
consequently, its capacity to wage war. The efficacy of the English tax system was
due largely to political reforms that strengthened the power of Parliament. ‘If the
monarch and his ministers could control Parliament, they were sure of consent for
their fiscal policies. The passage of a tax bill through Parliament, once achieved,
was far more potent than a decree for new taxes of an absolutist monarch.’33 But, as
ever, the tax system produced inequality. Ron Harris explains that during the
eighteenth century, tax contributions from people who were not represented in
Parliament increased, and the revenue thus collected was used to finance the
imperial-mercantile projects of those who were overrepresented in Parliament,
including the landed, financial and commercial elites.34 In terms of state building
and political development, the Glorious Revolution was undoubtedly a watershed
since it strengthened the authority of government, making it more effective both in
waging wars and in furthering economic opportunities.35 Indeed, as Daunton
explains, it was not just through open economic competition that England improved
its economic position. The government was closely involved in promoting economic
success by capturing markets and territories. He cites, as prime examples, the
Navigation Act that drove Dutch ship-owners out of the market and the protection of
the English textile industry against imports of dyed cloth from India.36 Thus North’s
attempt to link the Glorious Revolution with more secure property rights appears to
be an oversimplification.
The link that North makes between the enforcement of property rights and the
advent of the Industrial Revolution has also been questioned. McCloskey argues that
between 1688 and 1815, economic institutions in England did not change a great
deal. The Industrial Revolution, in her view, had little to do with major institutional
change because property and contract, the two main institution associated with
sustained growth, were already in place.37 Gregory Clark agrees, noting that
between the Glorious Revolution and the Industrial Revolution there was virtually
no institutional change that had a bearing on the incentive to innovate.38 Joel Mokyr
makes a similar point, albeit more guarded. In his view, the claim that the
enforcement of property rights gave England an advantage in the Industrial
31 Hoppitt (2011, pp. 94–95).
32 Hoppitt (2011, p. 93); see also, Richardson and Bogart (2008, p. 33); McCloskey (2010, p. 315).
33 Brewer (1988, p. 376).
34 Harris (2004, p. 226).
35 Ertman (1997, pp. 208–223).
36 Daunton (2010, p. 155).
37 McCloskey (2010, pp. 343, 354).
38 Clark (1993, p. 875).
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Revolution is exaggerated. Instead, he draws attention to the importance of informal
institutions as the stimulus to technological progress, rather than, as North argues,
the formal patent system.39 According to Mokyr, what mattered was the high level
of trust prevailing in civil society, which made it easier for individuals to engage in
transactions with strangers.40 While these authors acknowledge the importance of
secure property rights as a factor in explaining economic growth, they take issue
with North’s suggestion that there was a causal relationship between property rights,
scientific innovation and the Industrial Revolution.41 Indeed, some argue that the
causation line runs in the opposite direction: that it was the emergence of new
technologies that generated demand for property rights, and that this led to the
adjustment of property rights, which, in turn, facilitated further technological
innovation. From this perspective, property rights are a consequence not the cause
of technical change.42
2.1 Credible Commitment, Property Rights and Economic Growth
North makes a close link between the notions of secure property rights and credible
commitment. Property rights are said to be secure when the state is able to make a
credible commitment that it will respect them. The settlement associated with the
Glorious Revolution is an example of an historical event that created conditions for
the emergence of social and political trust, thus making credible commitment
possible. In wider political terms, credible commitment is a promise by the
sovereign to exercise its powers in accordance with predetermined rules or with
rules fashioned by the parties as they work out an understanding to accommodate
their respective interests. In this sense, credible commitment can be regarded as
equivalent to the notions of constitutionalism or rule of law. Yet, the notion of
credible commitment, as used by North, is not a normative concept, but more akin to
the notion of limited government. In fact, one of the main consequences of the
Glorious Revolution was to limit the powers of the monarchy. Yet, if North does not
purport to extract from the Glorious Revolution a normative model, what does his
analysis offer? One possibility, as David Stasavage suggests, is that the Glorious
Revolution can be seen as providing a model whereby the main players – the King
and Parliament – could trust each other because they had a veto over each other’s
actions: the King retained some of his prerogatives while Parliament could block
additional sources of revenue. In his view, however, veto points, either single or
multiple, are neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for commitment. In his
view, credible commitment ultimately depends on the way politics are structured. In
particular, it depends on the identity of the groups who control the veto points and
on the possibility of establishing cross-issue coalitions. These factors, he argues, are
as important as the existence of limited government.43
39 North (1981, pp. 164–165).
40 Mokyr (2009, p. 352); (2005, pp. 287–289); see also Crafts (2010).
41 Engerman and Sokoloff (2005, p. 664).
42 Lipsey et al. (2005, p. 261); Demsetz (2000, pp. 78–79).
43 Stasavage (2002, p. 184).
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In England after 1688, as Stasavage explains, creditors were well represented
in Parliament and were thus in a position to ensure that their interests were
protected. But he also notes that the government did not consistently fulfil its
commitment towards it creditors.44 A case in point was the South Sea Bubble of
1719–1720. Hoppitt describes the events leading to the Bubble as ‘an attempt to
privatize the national debt, sanctioned by act of parliament, and further
legitimated by personal financial backing from many members of the court and
parliament’.45 The shares in the South Sea Company subsequently collapsed,
causing investors – former creditors of the state – to endure severe financial
losses.46
North’s account of the South Sea scheme describes the event as a case of
refinancing and does not mention the involvement of the government in the
exchange of public debt into equity. He also appears to place the blame on the
Company and fails to connect this event to his notion of credible commitment.47
The foregoing suggests that the meaning of credible commitment is not easy to
grasp. If seen as a non-normative model, it is far too general to be useful. After all,
even inefficient property rights are based on some form of credible commitment.
Otherwise, they would either never come into existence or would last only for a very
short time. Besides, criminal organizations, such as the mafia, are also based upon
agreements to cooperate that, in formal terms, are no different from North’s notion
of credible commitment.
The notion of credible commitment has not captured the imagination of
development economists. Parnab Bardhan, for example, argues that credible
commitment is neither necessary nor sufficient for economic growth. The evidence
of the few success stories among non-Western countries such as Japan of the Meji
restoration, Korea and Taiwan in the 1960s and contemporary China confirms this.
As for sufficiency, many of the constraints on economic development cannot be
overcome merely by a commitment to limited government.48 Underlying Bardhan’s
argument is a more fundamental critique, which is that North’s theory offers an
oversimplified account of the Glorious Revolution and the Industrial Revolution.
Indeed, the claim here is that by focusing largely on property rights, North’s theory
ignores non-economic factors – such as technological development, educational
levels, resource endowment and geography – that have a bearing on the way society
and individuals engage in economic activity.49 Because of the excessive emphasis
that North places on institutions, some critics describe his interpretation as a form of
institutional determinism.50 Other critics simply point out that the weakness of his
theory is that, while secure systems of property rights are, undoubtedly, important
44 Stasavage (2002, pp. 156, 164–167).
45 Hoppitt (2011, p. 105).
46 Harris (2004, p. 227).
47 North et al. (2009, pp. 200–204).
48 Bardhan (2001, pp. 276/7); see also Bardhan (2005, pp. 55–85).
49 Engerman and Sokoloff (2005, p. 647).
50 Stromberg (2002).
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for economic growth, non-institutional factors also play a critical role in explaining
growth and economic change.51
According to North, the essence of property is the right to exclude.52 This notion
has been criticised as legalistic and oblivious to the fact that property rights are
social relations. Rosa Congost and other scholars argue that North’s legalistic notion
of property forecloses a wider analysis of property rights from socio-economic
perspectives such as social inequality and income distribution.53 Ha-Joon Chang
notes that North’s legalistic scheme does not fit all forms of property. The Chinese
town and village enterprise (TVE) is a case a point. Under the TVE system, formal
ownership is vested in local towns or villages, but the enterprise is run as if privately
owned.54 The regulation of common-pool resources offers another illustration of
property-right systems that is not easy to reconcile with North’s narrow concept of
property.55
While North’s definition of property is seen by many as excessively formal,
his economic approach to it is far from formalistic. Indeed, he firmly links his
concept of property to economic efficiency and defines efficient property as
property capable of generating sustained economic growth.56 Efficient property
rights are worthy of protection, while inefficient rights, such as those created by
the high tariff barriers or by selectively generous tax concessions, are not. It is
interesting to note that North’s concept of efficient property may explain his
alleged misinterpretations of English history. Indeed Daunton’s and Hoppitt’s
assessments of North’s views on property rights focus precisely on the failure to
afford equal protection to all forms of property. Indeed, in seventeenth-century
Britain, only efficient property rights were secure while property rights of the
clans in Scotland or landowners in Ireland were no more secure than the rights
of marginal groups in some developing countries today. According to Terra
Lawson-Remer, such exclusive concern with efficient property rights explains
why the only rights that seem worthy of protection in developing countries are
the rights of foreign investors, while the property and other rights of the poor are
consistently violated.57 Today, the efficiency perspective on property rights is
reflected in contemporary governance rankings that measure the protection of
property rights exclusively in terms of foreign investors’ perception of the risk
of expropriation.58
North’s commitment to efficient property rights does not add precision to his
analysis. Indeed, as Dani Rodrik and his associates argue, acknowledging that
property rights are important does not tell us the form they should take because
institutional arrangements are context specific. Without an analysis of the context,
51 Demsetz (2008, pp. 65–82).
52 North (1979, p. 250); (1981, p. 21); (1984, p. 208); (1990a, p. 33).
53 Congost (2003, pp. 74, 78); Milonakis and Fine (2007, p. 47).
54 Chang (2011, p. 8); Tian (2000); Zhang (2008).
55 Ostrom (2005, 1990); Bromley (2009, p. 21); (1989, p. 868).
56 North (1979, p. 251).
57 Lawson-Remer (2013, pp. 148, 151).
58 Przeworski (2004, p. 173).
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the call for protection of property rights is of little value.59 Thus, North’s conception
of secure property rights is narrow because it does not apply to every form of
property. It is also worth noting that secure property rights tend to have a
destabilizing impact because they are often associated with technical and economic
progress, which, in turn, generates new sources of conflict, which again calls into
question the security of property rights.60 Against this background it is difficult to
disagree with Adam Przeworski’s conclusion that the concept of secure property
rights is a muddle.61
There is little doubt that North’s interpretation of English and European history is
as controversial as it is inspiring. It would, of course, be surprising if there was a
consensus view on the interpretation of such momentous events as the Glorious
Revolution and the Industrial Revolution.62 My main concern here is to ascertain the
extent to which his interpretation of English and European history offers helpful
perspectives for understanding the predicament of countries that, in North’s
terminology, have so far failed to develop efficient property rights. North
acknowledges that England’s historical trajectory cannot be replicated, but argues,
nonetheless, that it reflects a ‘fundamental tendency of economies in the western
world’.63 In a more recent publication, he extended his analysis to show that the
history of the USA and France also illustrate this fundamental tendency.64
Ultimately, however, North’s focus on credible commitment and property rights
overlooks that political and economic development are multifaceted processes. As
Irma Adelman explains, identifying the nature and causes of economic growth and
development requires a broad focus. The single factor, property-rights approach
does not take into account the complex historical process underlying growth and
development in different contexts.65 Gunnar Myrdal, who was passionately
interested in the role of institutions in development, also rejects the focus on a
single factor, calling instead for a comprehensive analysis of all social factors that
have a bearing on growth.66 North probably did not disagree with the general
proposition that a theory of institutional growth must be comprehensive, stretching
its reach as wide as possible. Indeed, this may explain why, in recent years, he
focused almost exclusively on devising a theory of institutions and economic
growth. Whether North’s theoretical work is as multifaceted or as comprehensive as
Adelman and Myrdal would wish, is a question that can only be answered after
considering his theoretical framework in greater detail.
59 Rodrik et al. (2004, pp. 157–158).
60 Toye (2008, p. 522).
61 Przeworski (2004, p. 173).
62 See, for example, Bendix (1978); Pincus (2009); Goldstone (2002).
63 North (1993).
64 North et al. (2009).
65 Adelman (2001, pp. 104/5); see also Lane (1979, pp. 82–90).
66 Myrdal (1978, p. 773).
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3 Theory
North’s model of the ideal institutional framework is derived from his extensive
research in economic history. Under this framework, property rights are protected,
contracts are enforced and political authorities do not interfere with the choices
made by economic entrepreneurs. This framework enables markets to operate
efficiently over time. The time dimension is crucial since, as an economic historian,
North was aware that, in order properly to evaluate institutions, it is essential to take
into account their durability over time. An efficient institutional framework readily
adapts to changing circumstances.67 Such a framework provides economic and
political entrepreneurs with incentives that encourage decentralized decision-
making, enabling society to maximize opportunities for resolving social problems
and promoting successful economic change.68 Adaptively efficient institutions are
thus a necessary condition for achieving successful economic change. Yet, the
disparity between levels of economic growth between rich Western countries and
poor countries in the rest of the world suggests that very few countries have
managed to achieve efficient institutional frameworks. Why is this so? North’s
theory of institutions attempts to answer this question and offers a conceptual
framework to explain economic growth and institutional development.
North’s celebrated definition of institutions provided him with the starting point
to develop his theory. He defined them as follows: ‘Institutions are the rules of the
game in a society, or, more formally, are the humanly devised constraints that shape
human interaction.’69 Institutions are established to reduce the obstacles arising
from imperfect and asymmetrical information. The obstacles that institutions are
meant to overcome are described as transaction costs. North distinguished two kinds
of constraints: formal and informal. Together, these constraints comprise what he
called the rules of the game.70
In this section I argue that, despite many positive and interesting features,
North’s theory is ambiguous and even contradictory owing to three related features:
the pervasive and dominating influence of the principles of neoclassical economic
theory; his exclusive focus on an end-point model based on successful Western
economies; and, his reluctance to account for the role of organizations in the process
of change.
Although North acknowledged that neoclassical economics has serious short-
comings, his own theory did not significantly depart from its principles and is thus
susceptible to the same shortcomings. North’s focus on Western economies as the
end model for all states led him to regard any institutional framework that do not
meet the ideal standard as deviant cases and therefore not meriting close
investigation. His reluctance to offer a clear explanation about the role played by
organizations in past and present institutional frameworks enabled him to leave
67 North (1994, p. 367).
68 North (1990a, p. 81).
69 North (1990a, p. 3).
70 North (1990a, p. 4).
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social conflict out of his analysis and to ignore the complex nature of contemporary
organizational structures.
This section begins with some observations about North’s methodological
premises. It then examines the origins of the so-called rules of the game, explains
the distinction between formal and informal institutions and discusses his views on
institutional change. It concludes by considering his attempt to explain the link
between economic and political processes and the implications of the distinction
between institutions and organizations. Throughout this section, I make several
references to the link between North’s notion of rules of the game and legal rules.
However, I do not discuss law in detail as I do this in Sect. 4.
3.1 Neoclassical Economics and Transaction Cost Analysis
North’s theory draws mainly from the principles of neoclassical economic theory.71
He regards the market and the price mechanism as a fundamental component of
productive economies, is firmly committed to the view of individuals as utility
maximizers and accepts the principle of methodological individualism.72 In
philosophy, methodological individualism holds that the study of anything involves
the study of individuals since in reality only individuals, or collection of individuals,
are the subject of study.73 Under this view, collective entities are not real. The
version of methodological individualism, accepted by most economists, is generally
consistent with the view put forward by Joseph Schumpeter in 1908: the individual
is the basis for the study of economics, in particular for the study of the price
system.74 Schumpeter, however, does not extend the application of methodological
individualism beyond the operation of the price system. North, by contrast, employs
methodological individualism to the study of political and other social processes, as
evidenced by his comprehensive approach to transaction costs, which I discuss in
more detail below. For the moment, it is important to note that North adheres to the
view that institutions are the product of intentional human action and are not
predetermined by economic or any other logic.
North’s agreement with the basic principles of neoclassical economics is,
however, subject to an important qualification. In his view, neoclassical theory is
unable to account for economic growth since it is only concerned with the operation
of markets, not with the way markets develop overtime.75 As a consequence, it
ignores the role of institutions, regarding growth exclusively as a function of the
size of the population and the rate of savings.76 Hence, neoclassical theory only
explains economic performance at a particular time, but is unable to explain
dynamic change.77 Nevertheless, North’s intention is not to replace neoclassical
71 Zamagni (2010, p. 160).
72 North (2003); North (1994).
73 Bunge (2000, p. 393); Kincaid (2004, pp. 300/1).
74 Schumpeter (1980) [1908], p. 4; see also Blaug (1992, pp. 45, 229); and Udehn (2002, p. 483).
75 North (1996, p. 342).
76 North (1989, p. 1319).
77 North (1981, p. 57); (1984, p. 203).
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theory, but merely to improve its capacity to explain change over time. His main
departure from orthodox economic theory is in his rejection of the rationality
assumption relating to economic agents. According to neoclassical theory, market
players repeatedly face the same choices and their preferences remain stable. As a
consequence, players are capable of maximizing their preferences, and market
outcomes reflect a stable and efficient equilibrium. Although neoclassical theory
acknowledges that players might have incorrect information, it asserts that the
competitive process provides them with feedback, which enables them to take
rational decisions and pursue their maximizing objectives. Neoclassical theory,
according to North, can afford such unrealistic assumption about individual
behaviour because it takes institutions for granted.78 Since institutions play a critical
role in determining the choices individuals make, economic analysis cannot afford
to take institutions for granted. Thus, in order to bring institutions into his analysis
North proposes that the rationality assumption should be loosened, though not
dropped. In the real world, according to North, individuals do not face repetitive
choices, their access to information is generally inadequate and their ability to
process information is often blurred by their mental models. As a consequence, the
competitive process, without the support of adequate institutions, cannot by itself
generate suitable conditions to enable market players to adjust their preferences and
decisions to the environment.79 Once it is accepted that markets do not yield
efficient outcomes, the study of institutions becomes an essential component of any
research project interested in explaining the origin of markets, their performance
over time and the mechanisms that generate self-sustaining growth.
North’s conceptualization of institution also relies on an expanded interpretation
of Ronald Coase’s transaction cost analysis. That North should embrace transaction
cost analysis is unsurprising because the main point that Coase sought to emphasize
was that market transactions could not be properly understood without taking into
account institutions. Coase’s transaction cost analysis is so widely accepted that it
seems almost self-evident.80 Coase noted that in a world of zero transaction costs
the initial allocation of a property right is a matter of indifference because the
market will eventually assign it to the most valued user. Yet, since a zero transaction
cost world is merely a hypothesis, what Coase sought to highlight was that
institutions play a crucial role in facilitating, or obstructing, market transactions.
Coase does not offer a detailed analysis of market supporting institutions, but notes
that in the real world – a world of positive transaction costs – the role of legal
systems is critically important.81 Despite the enormous influence of his work, in
1991 Coase complained that his followers had failed to grasp his main objective,
which was to encourage others to study transactions in the real world, rather than
focusing on building unrealistic models of market exchange: ‘The time has surely
gone in which economists could analyze in great detail two individuals exchanging
nuts for berries on the edge of the forest and then feel that their analysis of the
78 North (1990a, p. 19); (1981, pp. 42–43).
79 North (1990a, p. 24); see also North (1981, pp. 1–7).
80 Coase (1937, 1960).
81 Medema (1999, 2011).
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process of exchange was complete, illuminating though this analysis may be in
certain respects.’82
Coase’s transaction cost analysis is applied by Oliver Williamson and Douglass
North, both leading figures within New Institutional Economics. Williamson’s
approach, also known as transaction costs economics, is concerned with alternative
forms of governance as means of overcoming costs brought about by the incomplete
nature of contracting.83 North, for his part, developed Coase’s transaction cost
analysis in a more ambitious direction. Not only does he apply transaction cost
analysis to examine costs directly associated with market transactions, but extends it
to include society as a whole. Thus, North’s broad conception of transaction costs
includes trading costs from the transfer of property rights in the market as well as
the costs incurred in running and operating economic and political systems.84 He
defines transaction costs as ‘the costs of specifying and enforcing the contracts that
underlie exchange and therefore comprise all the costs of political and economic
organization that permit economies to capture the gains from trade’.85 This broad
approach to transaction costs enables him to interpret the past, trace the evolution of
institutions and assess the relative merits of institutional arrangements regardless of
whether they are economic or political.86 Transaction cost analysis thus provides
North with a powerful instrument to explore non-economic issues without using
concepts from other disciplines. North’s confidence in the suitability of transaction
cost analysis to explain social phenomena across cultures and time is forcefully
expressed in an article on Karl Polanyi. In this article, he addresses Polanyi’s
argument that modern economics concepts should not be used to explain pre-market
societies. He rejects this view, arguing that transaction cost analysis ‘is a promising
analytical framework to explore non-market forms of economic organization’.87 His
reasoning is that all societies employ some mechanism to assign rights and allocate
benefits even though in some societies property rights in the Western sense may not
exist. Therefore, since wealth maximization is a universal principle, it can be
assumed that the same reason (transaction costs) that prompts economic actors to
choose substitutes to the market can also be used to explain the rationale of
economic institutions in pre-capitalist societies.88 Some have strongly criticised
North’s broad conception of transaction costs.89 Milonakis and Fine describe his
broad conception as an attempt that purports to explain almost anything while
distorting historical events.90 Such a broad approach also oversimplifies the analysis
82 Coase (1994, p. 12).
83 Williamson (1985, 1995 and 2005); for a comparison of the theoretical differences between
Williamson and North see, Hirsch and Lousbury (1996, p. 879).
84 North (1992, p. 6).
85 North (1984, p. 203).
86 Allen (2000, pp. 899, 902); Schlag (1989).
87 North (1977, p. 709).
88 North (1977, p. 711).
89 Milonakis and Fine (2007), Ankarloo (2002).
90 Milonakis and Fine (2007, p. 52); see also Ankarloo (2002).
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of social processes because it turns the concept of efficient markets into a gold
standard for the analysis of non-economic factors in society.91
North applies transaction cost analysis to study issues that are not generally
regarded as appropriate for economic analysis. Interestingly, the use of economic
analysis to explain non-economic issues was also considered by Schumpeter. By
contrast to North, however, his approach was restrained. In his view, economics
should respect the sphere of competence of other disciplines because its proper role
is to explain economic factors. He did not advocate extending economic analysis to
the study of non-economic factors.
When we succeed in finding a definite causal relation between two
phenomena, our problem is solved if the one which plays the ‘causal’ role
is non-economic. We have then accomplished what we, as economists, are
capable of in the case in question, and we must give place to other disciplines.
If, on the other hand, the causal factor is itself economic in nature, we must
continue our explanatory efforts until we ground upon a non-economic
bottom.92
North does not heed Schumpeter’s advice, relying instead on economic
methodology to analyse and explain economic and non-economic factors. This
approach enables him to exclude from his framework relevant research from other
social sciences, especially those that provide insights into social conflict and social
structure. Having excluded other social science disciplines, he resorts to psycho-
logical explanations. As Udehn explains,
[T]he rule guiding this form of methodological individualism says that no
economic explanation is considered successful until all exogenous variables
have been reduced to psychological states of individuals and natural
constraints. Social institutions may appear in the models of neoclassical
economics, but only as endogenous variables.93
Fortunately, North does not apply this methodology consistently. His discussion
on the origins of rules, the nature of institutional change and the link between
political and economic processes forces him partly to depart from methodological
individualism.94 In the end, however, his methodology becomes a straightjacket and
is one of the main reasons that explain the shortcomings of his theory.95
3.2 Rules of the Game
According to North, ‘institutions are created by individuals – evolve and are altered
by individuals’.96 He distinguishes institutions from organizations. Institutions are
91 Nelson (2002); Lane (1979, p. 84).
92 Schumpeter (1934, pp. 4–5).
93 Udehn (2002, p. 483).
94 Rutherford (1989, p. 303).
95 Field (1981, p. 178); (2006).
96 North (1990a, p. 5).
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the rules of the game while organizations along with individuals are players in the
game. This distinction, however, is not as clear as it seems. Indeed, North
acknowledges that, in some cases, which he does not specify, organizations are also
institutions since they provide a structure for human interaction.97 He insists,
however, that, although organizations may be regarded as institutions, it is the
individual, who, as a member of an organization, makes choices leading to the
establishment or change of institutions.98 I will return to North’s distinction between
institutions and organizations, but it is sufficient here to note that, in his view,
individuals are the originators of institutions, even though, occasionally, they are so
as members of organizations.
North does not restrict the concept of institution to economic institutions so his
theory applies to any set of rules that govern social interaction. It is not immediately
clear whether North’s rules of the game are merely heuristic devices to help us make
sense of economic processes, constitute the activity itself or are the cause that
determines the activity of individuals. He does not explicitly address these
questions. He simply states that institutions set the rules of the game and players –
individuals and organizations – play the game in accordance with these rules.
While North does not offer a clear explanation about the nature of the rules of the
game, he addresses this question, albeit indirectly, in his discussion on the origins of
formal and informal rules. He describes formal rules as a set of rules within a
normative hierarchy similar to those found in modern legal systems. His account
about the origins of informal rules suggests that they originate in the mind of
individuals, but are a reflection of prevailing cultural conditions. Thus, not
surprisingly, some observers describe his approach as culturalist.99 Others argue that
his theory of institution is close to the Old Economic Institutionalism because it
relies on social habits and tradition as sources of institutions.100 To clarify these
points it is necessary to look closer look at North’s conception of formal and
informal institutions.
Formal institutions, according to North, have a hierarchical structure similar to
legal norms, which runs from the constitution to statute and common law, to bylaws,
and contracts. ‘The rules descend from polities to property rights to individual
contracts.’101 Contracts reflect the incentives generated by the prevailing structure
of property rights. In other words, the opportunity set of economic actors is derived
from the prevailing structure of property rights.102 ‘The existing structure of rights
(and the character of their enforcement) defines the existing wealth-maximization
opportunities of the players, which can be realized by forming either economic or
political exchanges.’103 North’s description of formal institutions seems to equate
this type of institution with officially enacted legal rules. While this characterisation
97 North (1990a, p. 6).
98 North (2005a, p. 63).
99 Khalil (2012).
100 Rutherford (1994, pp. 43–50, 162–165).
101 North (1990a, p. 52).
102 North (1990a, p. 52).
103 North (1990a, p. 47).
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might seem unproblematic, especially for lawyers, it is not easy to reconcile with his
proposition that institutions are largely made and changed by individuals. Indeed,
his account of formal institutions entails a top-down conception of institutions as
imposed on individuals by external forces and hence is inconsistent with his view
that individuals are originators of institutions. This problem is also manifest when
he discusses the role of elites in framing social order and shaping the link between
economic and political processes.
Informal institutions or informal rules play an important role in North’s theory. In
Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance he acknowledges the
importance of informal constraints, including conventions, customs and codes of
behaviour, but does not fully explain how informal rules originate. He simply states
that subjective perceptions are both culturally derived and modified by experience.
He does, however, argue that changes in relative prices have the effect of gradually
altering cultural norms and ideology.104 Fifteen years later, relying on principles of
cognitive science, he presented a more refined interpretation of informal constraints,
linking them firmly to individuals’ shared mental models and belief systems.105
Informal constraints, according to North, originate in the mind and can be traced
back to cultural values. As a consequence, any attempt to bring about economic or
political change will either be facilitated or obstructed by prevailing cultural
values.106 Indeed, North repeatedly noted that the reason why so many plans to
reform the economy fail is because reformers focus on changing the formal rules of
the game, but disregard informal constraints. Those who want to bring about
institutional change must ensure that the informal rules of society are consistent
with the outcomes that the formal rules seek to achieve.107 Although North did not
claim to have a fully developed theory about cultural beliefs or ideology, in his
recent work he focused on the learning process as a means of understanding how
particular belief systems emerge.108 This process takes place in the mind of the
individual, but its cumulative effect has a societal impact beyond the control of any
single individual.109 Thus, choices made by individuals are shaped by their mental
models embedded in widely shared belief systems, which, in turn, are the product of
repetitive feedback from the social environment. North explains the link between
mental models, belief systems and institutions as follows: mental models are the
predictions the mind makes about the environment; these models are revised or
confirmed depending on the feedback individuals get from experience; mental
models that are repeatedly validated become beliefs; and finally, when beliefs are
widely shared they become belief systems.110 Thus, institutions are ‘nothing more
than shared mental models or shared solutions to recurrent problems of social
104 North (1990a, p. 138); see also Dugger (1995).
105 North (2005a, pp. 23–37, 48).
106 Denzau and North (1994, pp. 5, 20–21).
107 North (2006, pp. 54–55); (2005a, pp. 27–28); (1992, p. 27); (1994, p. 366).
108 North (2005a, pp. 15, 69, 136); see also North et al. (2009, pp. 27–29).
109 North (2005a, p. 61).
110 Mantzavinos et al. (2003, p. 4).
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interaction. Only because institutions are anchored in people’s minds do they ever
become behaviorally relevant’.111
The influence of culture and informal rules is pervasive, according to North.
Indeed, in his view, the reason why, throughout history, most societies have failed to
grow is because they are trapped in institutional frameworks that do not create
incentives to develop impersonal exchange. As a consequence, they are unable to
benefit from the division of labour.112 His views about the importance of culture and
belief systems in the process of institutional change are closely linked to his views
on path dependency. He regards the relationship between belief systems and
institutions as intimate. Belief systems are the internal representation of reality,
while institutions are structures that individuals impose on reality.113 As a
consequence, successful institutional change requires changing collective belief
systems.114 Since bringing about this type of change is difficult, institutions tend to
endure overtime and change slowly. The obstinate durability of institutions is what
he calls path dependence.115 Path dependence is relevant to understanding how
informal institutions originate and evolve. The dilemma is, of course, whether
reformers wishing to establish efficient institutions should engage in a campaign to
shift cultural values from collectivist ideologies towards individualistic approaches.
North shies away from this task because ‘the degree to which such cultural heritage
is ‘malleable’ via deliberate modification is still very imperfectly understood. At
any time it imposes severe constraints on the ability to effectuate change’.116 In the
end, he advises would- be reformers not to ignore cultural heritage.
Among informal institutions North includes superstitions, religions, myths,
prejudices and fundamentalist creeds, which he describes as a reflection of our
universal addiction to non-rational explanations of reality.117 This extensive list
presumably also includes ideology, although by 2005 he had largely abandoned the
use of this concept.118 Scientific theories are rational explanations, but not all
scientific theories meet North’s rationality test. For example, North regarded the
economic theories developed by the UN Economic Commission for Latin America
and the Caribbean (ECLAC) in the 1950s and 1960s as examples of erroneous
mental constructs that obstructed the path towards economic growth. In his view,
ECLAC economists’ mistaken attempt to attribute the plight of Latin American
economies to the deterioration of terms of trade was a rationalization that had the
effect of reinforcing the prevailing inefficient institutional framework.119 This
astonishing critique reflects a level of insularity that is rare in North’s scholarship.
His views on religious and irrational beliefs are interesting, but not fully developed.
111 Mantzavinos et al. (2003, p. 7).
112 North (1994, pp. 363/4).
113 North (2005a, p. 49); (2005b, pp. 24, 26).
114 North (1996, p. 353).
115 North (1990a, p. 112).
116 North (2005a, pp. 156, 58, 75).
117 North (2005a, pp. 72, 83, 156).
118 But see, exceptionally, North (2005a, p. 57).
119 North (1990a, pp. 99–100).
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Although he refers to Max Weber’s celebrated book The Protestant Ethic and the
Spirit of Capitalism, he refrained from taking sides in the longstanding debate over
Weber’s thesis on Calvinism and capitalism. He noted, however, that along with
Protestantism, the Catholic counter-reformation may have contributed to promoting
market-friendly behaviour.120 His views on Islam were less cautious. He attributed
the failure of Muslim countries to follow the dynamic scientific changes of the West
to culture.121
North’s main concern, however, was to identify cultural conditions (informal
institutions) that foster impersonal market exchange. Drawing on Avner Greif’s
work, he compares the approach of Maghribi and Genoese traders in the eleventh
century.
Maghribi traders were a cohesive community who developed a range of informal
mechanisms that enabled them to apply sound and effective trading practices. When
trade expanded and became impersonal their practices proved inadequate. By
contrast, Genoese traders, who were individualistic, developed bilateral legal
mechanisms that enabled them successfully to carry out impersonal trade.122 In the
context of North’s views on informal institutions, it is relevant to ask how Genoese
traders acquired their individualistic values. Was it social interaction? If so, why did
Maghribi traders involved in comparable activities, fail to develop similar values? If
the Genoese traders did not develop individualistic values through their trading
practices, how did they acquire them? North does not address this issue, but refers,
approvingly, to Alan McFarlane’s study on the origins of individualism in
England.123 McFarlane traces its origins to the thirteenth century, long before
market relations became dominant. If his interpretation is correct, then the obvious
question is how did English peasants acquire their individualism? A similar question
could be asked about the ideology of the traders from the Maghreb. If they were
engaged in activities similar to those of the Genoese traders, why were they unable
to discard their collectivist ideology? Interestingly, Barrington Moore, in his
magisterial Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy, poses a similar question
in relation to Japanese merchants during the Tokugawa period. Why did Japanese
merchants during this period not oppose traditional values, thus failing to develop
an outlook similar to that of their counterparts in the West? Moore rejects, as
question begging, explanations that focus on the psychological traits of Japanese
merchants or their value system. Instead, he argues that the answer can be found in
history, examining factors such as the country’s isolation, the long political
dominance of the warrior class and the merchants’ long association with them.124
North’s approach is different. He does not carry out this type of inquiry. Instead, he
attributes the behaviour of the Genoese and Maghribi traders to their mental maps.
Nevertheless, his views here reveal considerable ambivalence, as reflected in his
120 North (2005a, p. 135).
121 North (2005a, p. 44).
122 North (2005a, p. 136); Greif (2006, p. 269); for a critique of Greif’s interpretation see Edwards and
Ogilvie (2012); for Greif’s response see Greif (2012).
123 McFarlane (1978); for reviews of this work see Pocock (1980); Hilton (1980).
124 Moore (1966, p. 240).
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brief comments on a study by Jean-Philippe Platteau and Yujiro Hayami, which
discusses the origins of social norms in African and Asian communities.125 In their
work, Platteau and Hayami attribute the origins of these norms to structural
economic and demographic factors rather than to belief systems. While North
acknowledges that their argument is not unfounded, he avoids further discussion
claiming that ‘we are some distance from a definitive understanding of the source
and implications of diverse cultural backgrounds’.126 Ultimately, he refuses to
consider specific historical conditions as possible explanations for the diverse
behaviour of different social groups. Neither does he regard social interaction, even
market interaction, as relevant to the generation of cultural values.
North’s notion of culture poses a dilemma for his interpretation of economic and
political change. Indeed, as he constantly reminds his readers, while formal rules
can be changed by the stroke of the pen, informal rules are not easy to change.127
This is why the same rules applied in different societies often lead to dissimilar
outcomes, while different rules often yield the same result.128 The role of informal
constraints in understanding the process of change is crucial. Indeed, it would seem
that, provided that informal rules favour market outcomes, economic growth will
take place, even when prevailing formal rules may not be market-friendly.129 Thus,
while the efficacy of formal rules is dependent on favourable informal constraints,
the same is not necessarily true for informal rules. This is why North argues that
governments interested in improving economic performance must ensure that belief
systems in their respective societies favour the enforcement of efficient property
rights. ‘Institutions and belief systems must change for successful reform, since it’s
the mental modes of the actors that will shape choices.’130 He does not, however,
explain how this change of beliefs should come about, other than saying that it took
the West a long time to bring informal rules in line with the substantive demands of
the market.131 Nonetheless, he is convinced that the collectivist orientation
prevailing in some non-Western countries accounts for their failure to develop
sound economic systems.132
North is undoubtedly correct in pointing out that people’s beliefs about
institutions are important. When collective beliefs are in accord with the prevailing
institutional framework, the legitimacy of institutions is enhanced. Yet his analysis
of informal institutions does not explain how people, as a group, acquire their
beliefs.
Undoubtedly many collective beliefs are acquired over time and fall within the
category of traditions that are part of a group’s cultural heritage. Yet, many beliefs,
in the realm of politics, religion and commerce, are purposely created by powerful
125 Platteau and Hayami (1998).
126 North (2005a, p. 58).
127 North (2005a, p. 50).
128 North (1990a, p. 36).
129 North (1996, p. 353).
130 North (1996, p. 353).
131 North (1990a, p. 60); (1991, p. 107); (2005a, p. 163); North et al. (2009, pp. 27–29).
132 North (2005a), p. 101.
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groups. Although North refers to ideology he does not consider how ideological
manipulation might be related to people’s belief systems.133 Indeed, while it is true
that not all beliefs and practices are ‘amenable to deliberate human manipula-
tion’,134 not all value systems and norms grow spontaneously in communities. As
Barrington Moore explains,
[t]o maintain and transmit a value system, human beings are punched, bullied,
sent to jail, thrown into concentration camps, cajoled, bribed, made into
heroes, encouraged to read newspapers, stood up against a wall and shot, and
sometimes even taught sociology. To speak of cultural inertia is to overlook
the concrete interests and privileges that are served by indoctrination,
education, and the entire complicated process of transmitting culture from one
generation to the next.135
While North might have shared Moore’s views, his analysis of informal
institutions suggests that they are rigid and almost impossible to change. Yet, his
views on ideology were ambivalent. His concept of ideology is broad and
undistinguishable from cultural factors. It includes the individual’s subjective
perceptions, as well as religious and political ideology, which in 1990 he described
as organized ideologies.136 In this sense he acknowledges that ideology is an
external force that plays a role in changing behaviour.137 He is also confident that
the impact of organized ideology does not last forever. Indeed, in relation to the
economic and political liberalization that took place in Eastern Europe, he notes that
socialist ideology, despite its enormous power, was swiftly dislodged by individ-
uals’ proclivity to maximize their wealth.138 Despite his ambivalence, what emerges
from his analysis is that a critical source of informal institutions is the community or
as he describes it, ‘the cultural transmission of values’.139 Thus, he effectively
removes the individual as the primary source of informal institutions.140 Informal
institutions are not the product of isolated entrepreneurs who strive to maximize
their utility. On the contrary, informal institutions emerge spontaneously from ‘a
process of innovation and imitation that takes place in a social group that is learning
collectively. Individuals respecting conventions, following moral rules, and
adopting social norms cause (as an unintended outcome of their action) the
emergence of social order’.141 North did acknowledge Friedrich Hayek’s influence
in the development of this evolutionary conception of informal institutions.142
133 North (2005a, pp. 57–58).
134 North (2005a, p. 50).
135 Moore (1966, p. 486).
136 North (1990a, p. 23).
137 North (1990a, p. 140).
138 North (1990a, p. 132); see also (2005b, p. 29); (1997, p. 17).
139 North (1990a, p. 138).
140 Knight and North (1997, p. 218).
141 Mantzavinos et al. (2003, p. 8).
142 North (2005a, pp. 32/3, 36, 51); see also Zouboulakis (2005).
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3.3 Institutional Change
North’s conceptual framework envisages institutional change, but change, when it
happens, is incremental and unlikely to shift in the direction of adaptive efficiency.
Indeed, his ideal end point for institutions seems beyond the reach of most countries.
He attributes this to unfavourable cultural and political conditions prevailing in
countries outside the small magic circle of advanced industrialized economies. This
unpromising situation explains why, in 1990, North warned his readers that his
theory ‘provides no guarantee of a happy ending’.143 This subsection explains the
reasoning underlying his pessimism and considers whether it reflects an irre-
deemably flawed reality or exposes the shortcomings of his theory.
The main sources of institutional change are variations in relative prices and in
players’ tastes. Changes in relative prices include changes in the ratio of factor
prices, in the cost of information and technology. Some changes are exogenous (for
example, caused by the outbreak of a major epidemic) while some are endogenous
(brought about by the internal dynamic of the economic process) and reflected in the
maximizing efforts of economic actors.144 Institutions establish a structure of
incentives that enable economic entrepreneurs to adjust while maximizing their
utility. High returns for certain productive activities prompt economic actors to
invest in them. Thus North states that ‘[I]f the highest return in an economy is to
piracy we can expect that the organizations will invest in skills and knowledge that
will make them better pirates.’145 If his maximizing entrepreneurs do not focus on
becoming better pirates it is because social norms, conditioned by changes in tastes,
bring about institutional changes that outlaw piracy (or slavery and similar
activities). Likewise, he attributes the abolition of slavery not to economic factors
relating to efficiency or transaction costs, but to the emergence of norms that
question the legitimacy of one person owning another.146 However, he does not
explain the political, social or economic factors underlying the shift in moral
preferences.
North’s assessment of the role of individual entrepreneurs in the process of
institutional change is not encouraging. He notes that, while changes in relative
prices provide the lone entrepreneur with the incentive to seek institutional change,
the likelihood of achieving success is limited. Imperfect markets, bounded
rationality, path dependency and ideological prejudices are all factors that account
for the frequency of inefficient outcomes. As a consequence, the entrepreneur is left
with two unattractive choices: either to accept minor and unsatisfactory adjustments
to the rules of the game or express dissatisfaction by refusing to comply with
prevailing rules. But since the option of non-compliance is risky, most people prefer
to wait for others to take the initiative.147 Thus, efficient outcomes – that is, market
143 North (1990a, p. 132).
144 North (1990a, p. 84).
145 North (2005a, p. 61).
146 North (1990a, p. 24).
147 North (1990a, pp. 86–90).
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outcomes that yield the lowest possible production and transactions costs – are
elusive, while free-riding on the efforts of others seems to be the social norm.148
Efficient political outcomes are also elusive. Indeed, they are exceptional since
political markets are even less perfect than economic markets. The most important
function of rulers is to specify, enforce and protect property rights. But rulers are
inclined to safeguard their narrow interests rather than achieve outcomes that further
productive activities.149 Two main reasons explain their behaviour: (1) they face
competitive constraints compelling them to establish property rights that benefit
powerful groups in the polity; and, (2) they face transaction cost constraints because
since enforcing an efficient system of property rights is costly they would not
necessarily benefit from such a system in terms of revenue. As a consequence, rulers
are inclined to grant monopoly rights rather than encourage competition.150 Under
this view, rulers (or the state) are indispensable and inadequate: indispensable
because they establish and specify property rights that facilitate market exchange;
and inadequate because they consistently fail to design an ideal structure of rights.
These factors explain why institutional change, when it occurs, is slow and rarely
culminates with the establishment of efficient institutions. Thus, North’s theory of
institutional change leads to a deadlock. Economic processes do not yield efficient
outcomes because entrepreneurs operate in imperfect markets and do not have the
capacity or incentive to promote changes. Likewise, political entrepreneurs are also
incapable of providing efficient solutions because they represent the interest of
powerful groups who are generally satisfied with the prevailing structure of property
rights and other political advantages. This unpromising situation explains why
North warns his readers that his theory does not guarantee a happy ending.
3.4 Political Development
North rightly identifies the problem that leads his theory into a deadlock. It is the
conceptualization of the link between economic and political processes. Accord-
ingly, in his most recent book, Violence and Social Orders, he sets out to provide a
systematic account of this link, focusing in particular on the way societies have
handled the problem of violence.151 In the opening pages, he and his co-authors
confidently state that, hitherto, social scientists have failed to understand the
connection between the economy and the polity because they have not seriously
studied the problem of violence.152 This bold evaluation of the contribution of social
science to the study of political development is undoubtedly controversial. My task,
however, is not to assess its validity, but to ascertain whether his new approach
resolves the deadlock in his theory of institutions.
North divides social orders that have existed historically into three types:
foraging orders, limited-access orders and open-access orders (hereafter OAOs).
148 North (2005a, p. 15); (1979, p. 258).
149 North (1981, p. 28).
150 North (1981, p. 28).
151 North et al. (2009).
152 North et al. (2009, p. xi).
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Foraging orders, no longer in existence, prevailed in hunter-gatherer societies.
Limited-access orders, or natural states, have been around for more than ten
thousand years. Open- access orders date back to the middle of the nineteenth
century, and are associated with sustained political and economic development of
the type that led to the establishment of successful market economies in Western
Europe and North America. Today, only a minority of states fall within the OAO
category – no more than 25 – and includes only 15 % of the world population.153
The rest of the world lives in limited-access orders. OAOs are easy to identify as
they follow closely the ideal features of liberal democracies in advanced market
economies. OAOs have the following characteristic: (1) a widespread belief in
inclusion and equality; (2) no entry restrictions to economic, political, religious, and
educational activities; (3) support for the establishment of organizations designed to
further these activities; (4) impersonal exchange; and, (5) impartial enforcement of
the rule of law (ibid:114). A critical feature of OAOs is that they resolve the
problem of violence by asserting democratic control over the military.
While it is easy to recognize the kind of political regime underlying North’s
description of OAOs, this is not the case with his description of natural states. His
characterization of these states is not based on the features of any single country or
group of countries. Instead, using OAOs as the ideal standard, he proceeds to
identify the feature of countries that do not meet this standard. Thus, by contrast
with OAOs, natural states have not fully resolved the control of violence and are
therefore unable to guarantee auspicious conditions for productive trade and
investment. Members of the dominant coalition in natural states have access to
violence and grant each other special privileges to assets and valuable activities.
Natural states remain stable, but only as long as the dominance of the ruling
coalition is unchallenged. While natural states favour some forms of productive
activities, they cannot guarantee secure property rights or orderly economic
processes because they arbitrarily allocate political rights and economic privileges.
Natural states do not fully control the sources of violence, and organizations
established in these states tend not to survive beyond the life of their founders.
Moreover, by contrast with OAOs, natural states restrict peoples’ access to
economic and political activities, do not treat them as equals, do not enforce the law
impartially and do not establish conditions that promote impersonal market
exchange.
North’s description of natural states is too general to be helpful. It reads almost
like a caricature of the political economic structures of developing countries.
Indeed, the notion of natural state is so broad that countries as different as Argentina
and Malawi, India and Sudan, or Malaysia and Myanmar, are all in the same group.
Anticipating criticism North distinguishes three types of natural state: fragile, basic
and mature.
Fragile are those that are on the verge of collapse and are unlikely to survive any
threat of violence. Basic natural states have an organizational framework that
defines the structure of the state and regulates relations among members of the
dominant coalition. Mature natural states are more advanced and are capable of
153 North et al. (2009, p. xii).
398 J. Faundez
123
maintaining independent elite organizations. But, how do mature natural states
become OAOs? North offers no clear answer. Instead, he identifies three conditions,
described as doorstep conditions, which once in place might generate incentives
towards establishing OAOs. They are: rule of law for elites; perpetually lived
organizations in the public and private spheres and consolidated control over the
military.154 He defines rule of law for elites as the case where relations among
members of the elite are governed by legal procedures partly protected by a judicial
body. Perpetually lived organizations foster the existence of impersonal relation-
ships and exchange, thus securing the inviolability of contracts and the protection of
property rights.155 Consolidated control over the military requires an organization
that is embedded within the structure of the state and controls all the military
resources.156 North does not, however, explain why doorstep conditions emerge in
some countries and not in others. Neither does he offer a satisfactory account about
the transitions from mature state to open-access order. In his view, the transition
begins when the elites transform their privileges into impersonal rights. Yet he does
not explain what prompts them to make this concession. Instead he states that they
do so when they ‘perceive that their privileges will be more secure from intra-elite
competition when those privileges are defined as commonly shared rights rather
than personal prerogatives’.157 In any event, he points out that asking what prompts
elites to give up their privileges is the wrong question and suggests an alternative
question: ‘Why do elites transform their unique and personal privileges into
impersonal rights shared equally among elites?’158 The answer to this is that they do
so when it is in their interest to do so. However, this answer does not address a more
fundamental question: what prompts them to realise that they no longer need to
cling on to their privileges? North does not address this question, finding it
superfluous. He regards institutional change as a smooth process that happens when
enlightened and self-interested elites realise that it is in their interest to transform
their privileges into abstract rights. This interpretation seemingly resolves the
question of the link between political and economic processes since the elites
oversee and determine the timing of the institutional transition from natural states to
OAOs. The difficulty, however, is that it fails to take into account that, throughout
history, elites have consistently used force to defend and enhance their privileges.
The history of countries classified as OAOs offers well-known illustrations of the
diverse strategies employed by elites to protect their privileges. As noted earlier,
North attributes the abolition of slavery to changes in moral preferences, not to
political and social struggles. Likewise, the relatively recent struggle for civil rights
in the United States is another case that shows that elites do not make political
concessions merely because they are enlightened. North acknowledges, in passing,
that the 1964 Civil Rights Act in the United States was preceded by violent
154 North et al. (2009, p. 151).
155 North et al. (2009, p. 152).
156 North et al. (2009, p. 153).
157 North et al. (2009, p. 190).
158 North et al. (2009, p. 25).
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confrontation.159 Yet, he does not regard this, or similar experiences in other
countries, as contradicting his view that elites make concessions when it is in their
interest to do so. In any event, most historians, and even lawyers, are fully aware
that the extension of rights to subordinate classes in nineteenth-century Europe was
not conflict-free nor was it the product of gracious concession by enlightened
elites.160
A point North failed to develop is related to the possibility of transplanting
institutions modelled on OAOs regimes so as to speed up the process of change. In
Sect. 4 (below), I explain that North was critical of development assistance projects
that disregard the cultural heritage and political structures of recipient countries.
This, he believed, was futile because social orders have their own logic that should
not be disturbed. Indeed, institutions transplanted from outside will either fail to
work or, worse, may disrupt the social order of natural states. Intriguingly, however,
when he traced the history of the transition to OAOs of countries that he described
as the first movers (England, France, Holland and the United States), he
acknowledged that, elsewhere in the world, subsequent transitions achieved similar
institutional outcomes regarding key institutions and the widespread extension of
citizenship rights. He rejected the view that these similar outcomes can be explained
as an incident of modernity. Yet, in characteristically eclectic style, he concluded
that ‘the first movers deliberately constructed social tools that supported more
sophisticated organizations and made those tools available to all elites’.161 The
notion that the first movers made their institutional tools widely available to elites
elsewhere in the world might suggest that agencies promoting the establishment of
similar institutions in developing countries are not necessarily following such an
unreasonable policy. Unfortunately, North did not pursue this point.
3.5 Institutions and Organizations
North’s distinction between social orders offers an academically interesting
classification of regime types, but neither resolves the issue concerning the link
between economic and political processes nor offers a persuasive alternative theory
of political development. Also he fails to link, explicitly and systematically, his
findings in Violence and Social Orders with his theoretical work. It could well be
that this book was only a prolegomenon to future work. For the purpose of this
paper, what needs to be examined is why did North fail properly to address the link
between economic and political processes. To do this, it is necessary to discuss his
approach to the following three related issues: the relationship between informal and
formal institutions; the distinction between institutions and organizations; and the
link between the behaviour of individuals and macro social processes. In brief, why
is it that, in North’s conceptualization, the lone entrepreneur is unable to have a
wider societal impact? Why is s/he permanently blocked by selfish political
159 North et al. (2009, p. 120).
160 Bendix (1977 [1964], pp. 89–126).
161 North et al. (2009, p. 194).
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entrepreneurs? In other to answer these questions it is necessary to examine how
North envisages the relationship between the individual and social institutions.
According to North, institutions are created and altered by individuals. However,
he does not consistently adhere to the view that individuals are the sole originators
of institutions. As noted above, informal institutions are not generated by the action
of isolated individuals, but are the product of belief systems, developed and
validated by cultural and community values. There is no doubt that North’s insights
into the relationship between culture and economic change are valuable. Never-
theless, his theory fails to explain how informal institutions are transformed into
formal institutions. In the final paragraph of his 1990 book, Institutions, Institutional
Change, and Economic Performance, he acknowledges that he failed to find an
answer to this important issue.162 Nonetheless, did not revisit this question.
Although he repeatedly observes that informal and formal institutions should be
properly aligned to achieve positive outcomes, he does not consider how informal
institutions become formal institutions. An explanation for this omission may be
that while his conception of informal rules is largely psychological, his conception
of formal rules is top down and legalistic. His description of formal rules is hard to
distinguish from a lawyer’s description of the hierarchy of rules in a modern legal
system. Therefore, it is hardly surprising that he has been unable to link informal
and formal institutions other than by warning that formal institutions should not
ignore prevailing cultural constraints. In any event, North’s top-down account of
formal institutions overrides his fundamental premise that institutions are created by
individuals. Legal rules, are created, interpreted and changed by organizations, not
by lone individual entrepreneurs or selfish political operators. If this analysis is
correct, why then does North fail to acknowledge that the rules of the game do not
emerge spontaneously from the minds of individuals, but instead are artefacts
created by organizations? Although he does not completely ignore this question, his
response is incomplete and does not dispel the ambiguity in his theory.
One of the most confusing features of North’s conceptualization is his distinction
between institutions and organizations. This distinction is unclear, as has been noted
by several scholars.163 Institutions, according to North, are the rules of the game,
while organizations are players. Organizations consist of groups of individuals
bound by a common purpose and are subject to the same rules as individuals. Yet,
he admits that in some cases, which he does not identify, organizations can also be
regarded as institutions, as they provide a structure for human interaction.164 He
insists, however, that, although organizations are players, it is the individual, who,
as a member of an organization, makes decisions leading to the establishment, or
alteration, of institutions.165 Nevertheless, when he describes economic processes he
assigns a critically important role to organizations. ‘Organizations are a response to
the institutional structure of societies, and, in consequence, the major cause of the
alteration of that institutional structure.’ And he adds:
162 North (1990a, p. 140).
163 Barzel (2002, p. 14); Hodgson (2006, p. 10), Dam (2006, pp. 22–23).
164 North (1990a, p. 6).
165 North (2005a, p. 63).
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As the organization evolves to capture the potential returns, it will gradually alter
the institutional constraints from within. It will do so either indirectly, via the
interaction between maximizing behaviour and its effect on gradually eroding or
modifying informal constraints; or it will do so directly, via investing in altering the
formal rules.166
Given these statements, it is surprising that he does not explain the relationship
between institutions and organizations. Instead, organizations simply disappear
from his theory. Although in Violence and Social Orders he brings organizations
back into his conceptualization – as permanently lived organizations – their role is
merely as players in an otherwise tranquil environment of open access orders.
There are, undoubtedly, good reasons to explain why North chooses to ignore the
link between institutions and organizations. One explanation is that had he
developed the notion of organizations as creators of institutions, the clarity and
simplicity of his model would have been disturbed. Just as the rationality
assumption enables economists to offer a simple, persuasive and powerful
explanation about the operation of markets, the exclusion of organizations from
his theory could well be seen as a small price to pay for keeping the explanation
simple. Some would regard this level of simplification as necessary in order to meet
Ockham’s Razor test.167 While this may well be valid regarding model building,
ignoring organizations raises problems for North’s theory of institutions. Indeed,
ignoring them at the theoretical level, while simultaneously acknowledging that
they play a role in establishing and destroying institutions, leaves a major gap in his
theory. Indeed, by failing to explain their interaction he takes organizations for
granted. This is ironic, because, as already noted, North launched his investigation
into institutions in the belief that neoclassical economics cannot explain growth
since it takes institutions for granted. Yet, his theory does not account for entities
that play an active role in shaping, interpreting and imposing rules of the game. In
the absence of an explanation clarifying how institutions are transformed into
concrete organizations; how institutional rules become binding on individuals; and
how organizations relate to institutions, it is difficult to establish the extent to which
his theory helps us to understand institutional and economic change in the real
world.
North also fails to explain how individual choices have an impact at the macro
level of society. He undoubtedly assumes – in line with the way most economists
interpret methodological individualism – that the only valid focus of analysis is on
choices made by individuals and that collective choices are merely the aggregation
of individual choices.168 From this perspective, social systems and social structures
disappear and the only object of analysis is the individual. Nevertheless, because he
admits that organizations also create institutions, it would appear that he accepts that
organizations are social facts independent of individuals. Hence he seems to depart
from methodological individualism. Yet, he refuses to reflect on this point and
simply states that, even when organizations behave as institutions – that is, when
166 North (1990b, p. 390).
167 Spade (2000, pp. 101–102).
168 Hirsch et al. (1987, pp. 318, 321); Archer (2003, p. 61).
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they create rules of the game – those who make choices within the organizations are
individuals.169 This explanation does not take into account that individuals occupy
positions and play roles requiring choices that are collectively determined by them
as officers or role players within the organization, not in their individual capacity.
It is well known that organizations play an important role in contemporary
societies. It is not necessary to embrace sociological holism to acknowledge this
fact. Indeed, James Coleman, one of the leading proponents of methodological
individualism in sociology, identifies as urgent the need to account for the role of
organizations.170 In brief, he argues that contemporary societies have seen the
emergence of constructed organizations, a new type of social actor, which has rights
and responsibilities that are not immediately linked to natural persons.171
Constructed organizations have enormous economic power and the capacity to
establish rights and obligations and to influence the direction of political events.
According to Coleman, many conservative and liberal social theorists, such as
Hayek, mistakenly assume that the path to a prosperous market society requires only
minimum political interference by the state. Hence Hayek’s opposition to any form
of organization established by the state and his celebrated views about the rule of
law as a mechanism designed to provide a broad, but unobtrusive framework to
support market processes.172 There is no doubt that North shares Hayek’s views
about the role of the state. Indeed, his open-ended and vague conception of
institutions seems purposely designed to serve as a general framework that sets
minimal conditions for the operation of markets. According to Coleman, however,
the view that, in the contemporary world, economic problems can be resolved
simply by reducing state interference fails to take into account the overwhelming
economic and political importance acquired by organizations. In his view, ‘the
existence of complex social relations in constructed social organizations makes
possible a mode of social control in which rights, constraints, and rewards need not
arise from two-party relations, but can be imposed by a third party, the corporate
actor’.173 As a counterbalance to this new force he proposes building social capital
within these organizations, so recreating the solidarity and informality that existed
when simpler relations of exchange prevailed. Interestingly, while Coleman calls
upon social theorists and economists to take organizations seriously, North, who
developed his theory at the same time as Coleman, ignores organizations,
introducing instead a notion of institution that is difficult to relate to any concrete
social organization. North, of course, does not share Coleman’s assessment of
constructed organizations as potentially posing a threat to social order. On the
contrary, North has no doubt that the emergence of ‘permanently lived organiza-
tions’ is desirable and is an unequivocal indication of progress towards the end goal
that all states should be aiming for: the open access order modelled on Western
liberal economic and democratic regimes. Regardless of whether Coleman’s
169 North (2005a, p. 63).
170 Coleman (1990, pp. 53–578).
171 Coleman (1993, p. 2).
172 Hayek (1973; 1960).
173 Coleman (1991, p. 17).
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assessment of the role of organizations is correct, the critical point here is that
North’s failure fully to incorporate organizations within his framework results in a
theory of institutions that is far removed from the real world. As explained, this
failing is ultimately linked to his reluctance to shift away from the principles of
neoclassical economics and his unwillingness to engage with the findings of other
social sciences.
4 Law
Law figures prominently in North’s theory: it is the main source of the formal rules
of the game and plays a crucial role in supporting market exchange. In particular, it
provides enforcement mechanisms that help to strengthen the efficacy and
credibility of commitments made by economic and political entrepreneurs. Law is
also the standard used to identify political regimes and – in its guise as the rule of
law – provides the institutional mechanism that facilitates the transition of natural
states to open access orders. Thus, law in North’s theory is ubiquitous, which is
unsurprising since his definition of institutions as rules of the game has strong
normative overtones, and it is difficult to distinguish his general concept of formal
institutions from legal rules. Yet, despite the seemingly strong affinity between his
theory of institutions and the notion of law, it is difficult to assess law’s role in his
theory. Does he regard law as an independent component or as a mere adjunct to
political and economic processes? In order to address this question it is necessary to
revisit his distinction between institutions and organizations.
4.1 Institution or Organization?
North distinguishes institutions from organizations. Institutions are the rules of the
game, while organizations are players in economic, political and social processes.
Since North equates formal institutions with legal rules he seems to see law as an
institution because institutions create rules of the game. Yet, if this interpretation is
correct, it would contradict his assumption that institutions are created only by
individuals. Indeed, although most theories of democracy find ways of reconciling
legal rules established in a democratic regime with the notion of individual
autonomy, legal rules, as a system, are external to the individual and independent of
their will. That legal systems are not merely the aggregation of individual wills is
widely acknowledged by a diverse group of social theorists, including Karl Marx,
Max Weber, Emile Durkheim, Eugene Ehrlich and Talcott Parsons. Indeed, North
also seems to accept this view since his other main postulate is the notion of path
dependence. The path dependent feature of institutions entails accepting that they
persist over time and thus outlive the design or the will of individuals. The so-called
permanently lived organizations, which North regards as essential components of
open access orders, are permanently lived precisely because they are independent of
individual whims or desires. It could, of course, be argued that North’s views on the
role of individuals in the design of legal institutions are vindicated when the focus
of analysis is on discrete legal transactions, such as contracts. This is a view that has
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been considered by social theorists. Indeed, in his well-known critique, Talcott
Parsons argues against the utilitarian conception that regards the mutual advantage
of the parties as the principal binding force underlying contracts. Drawing on
Durkheim’s observation about the non-contractual foundations of contract law,
Parsons notes that utilitarians fail to notice that contracts.
are actually entered into in accordance with a body of binding rules which are
not part of the ad hoc agreement of the parties. The elements included in the
utilitarian conception are, on the contrary, all taken into account of in the
terms of agreement. What may, however, be called the ‘institution’ of contract
– the rules regulating relations of contract – has not been agreed to by the
parties but exists prior to and independently by any such agreement.174
In so far as legal institutions create rules of the game, North undoubtedly regards
law as an institution. He also considers law as an organization. However, because
his theory does not focus on organizations, he has little to say about the way law
operates in practice. While acknowledging the overriding importance of contract
and property rights, he is not, on the whole, concerned with the way property rights
and contract may change overtime. He does, however, note that in pre-modern
societies – characterised by dense social networks and localised trade – the
protection of property and the enforcement of contracts were not at issue since they
were controlled by informal community constraints.175 As societies became more
complex and trade expanded beyond the immediate community, local constraints
lost their efficacy. Thus, in early modern Europe, before the consolidation of nation
states, economic agents developed a variety of mechanisms to protect their property
and ensure the enforcement of contracts.176 These mechanisms, generally described
as lex mercatoria or law merchant, are generally regarded as having had a major
influence on the development of markets and legal systems in Europe.177 According
to this view, merchants developed a series of customs in support of their contracting
practices, thus enabling them to reduce transaction costs and develop a framework
auspicious to extensive impersonal exchange. Thus, by the end of the eleventh
century lex mercatoria, as a mechanism designed to coordinate the conflicting
interests of merchants and their agents, is said to have governed most commercial
transactions.178 Recent research casts doubt on this conception of lex mercatoria. In
her important book on merchant guilds in medieval Europe, Sheilagh Ogilvie argues
that there is no evidence that lex mercatoria was a universally accepted system of
commercial law. Lex mercatoria was rarely mentioned in medieval commercial
practice and when it was, it referred to a set of procedural rules for prompt and
effective conflict resolution. According to Ogilvie, since merchant law was derived
from customary practices, there was considerable diversity from one locality to
174 Parsons (1968 [1937], p. 311); see also, Durkheim (1964 [1893], pp. 206–219); Palumbo and Scott
(2003); Rueschemeyer (2005, pp. 146–147).
175 North (1990a, p. 120).
176 Milgrom et al. (1990).
177 North (1990a, p. 128), Greif (2006, pp. 314, 316).
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another. The substantive rules of contract law were an amalgam of general
principles of Roman Law, statutes issued by local rulers and community custom.179
Regardless of the accuracy of North’s views about lex mercatoria, it is interesting
that his account attributes the emergence of law to the interaction among merchants,
rather than to predetermined rules of the game. This interactional perspective on the
origins of commercial law, undoubtedly interesting, is not easy to reconcile with his
overall theory of institutions. Thus, it is not surprising that he does not develop this
line of inquiry, reverting instead to his concept of institution as devices that set rules
of the game so that players can perform their pre- assigned roles. Undoubtedly, what
attracts him to this interactional interpretation of the origins of lex mercatoria is that
it is often used to demonstrate that private ordering is more efficient than the state
and is often several steps ahead of the state in finding imaginative solutions to social
problems.180
North considers law as an organization, but does not explain what type of
organization it might be. He seems to regard legal phenomena as isolated events
rather than the product of a complex interaction of organizations, legal and non-
legal, that influence the behaviour of individuals, groups and other organizations.
Moreover, he also seems to assume that legal rules are routinely obeyed, in which
case no further analysis is required. If by chance legal rules are not obeyed (or in his
terminology, that formal rules of the game are not followed), this does not impinge
on his theory.
From a legal theory perspective, his approach is equivalent to that associated with
some forms of legal positivism, which, conceiving legal norms as detached from
reality, distinguish between the validity of the norm (rules of the game) and its
application in society. The link between the norm and reality, which Hans Kelsen
describes as effectiveness, is not a matter for legal science, but for politics or
sociology.181 Thus, Weber’s critique of Rudolf Stammler applies to North, because
he also confuses ‘the ideal validity of a norm with the assumed validity of a norm in
its actual influence on empirical action. The former can be deduced systematically
by legal theorists and moral philosophers; the latter, instead, ought to be the subject
of empirical observation’.182 Eugene Ehrlich, one of the precursors of legal
sociology, expresses this distinction as the difference between law in the books and
living law.183
North is not concerned with the way rules are interpreted or applied. Within his
conceptual framework, the world is divided into two groups: rule makers and rule
takers. Institutions are rule makers and individuals and organizations are rule takers.
There is no room in his theory for conflicting interpretations over the meaning of
rules or the behaviour of organizations. He has stated that he is not interested in
discussions over the interpretation of rules within organizations, since his main
179 Ogilvie (2011, pp. 264–267).
180 Kadens (2012); Michaels (2012).
181 Kelsen (2006 [1949], pp. 41–44); (1960, pp. 272/3).
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concern is the macro aspects of organizations, not their internal structures.184 This
lack of interest in the behaviour of organizations stems from the fact that he regards
organizations as irrelevant to understanding institutional change. His stance reveals
a misconception about the way law and legal organizations operate in society,
assuming that they are interesting from a micro managerial perspective, but
irrelevant for an understanding of macro institutional change. This is consistent with
a view that regards legal phenomenon as an isolated event, not the product of a
complex interaction of legal, political and economic factors. However, improve-
ments in the protection of property rights in a society, for example, are the outcome
of a range of substantive social and economic factors, as well as the interaction of a
constellation of institutions. It is because of this complex interaction of societal
factors and organizations that major institutional change is difficult to predict and
why so often institutional outcomes are unexpected. The main lesson to be drawn
from attempts to improve the rule of law in developing countries is that major
institutional shifts are difficult to achieve because institutions are interdependent
and economic institutions are not the only institutions that have to change in order to
bring about improvements in economic performance. Unfortunately, North’s
decision to exclude organizations from his analysis on managerial grounds fatally
undermines his theory’s capacity to explain the direction and tempo of institutional
change. It also explains why North and his associates have not succeeded in
establishing a fruitful dialogue with law and development and socio-legal scholars.
4.2 Law as a Black Box
The shortcomings of North’s theory are reflected in some of his comments on the
way legal systems operate. He acknowledges that the development of reliable and
efficient judicial institutions in Europe was a slow process measured in centuries,
not decades.185 He also concedes that, even in countries with efficient and honest
judicial systems, judges and courts are not infallible. After all, he regards judges as
agents subject to the perennial conflict of interest that characterises principal/agent
relationships. They have their own utility function so their decisions are often
determined by their own interests.186 Thus, he has no sympathy for those who hold
that some legal systems are inherently more efficient than others or that the nature of
a legal system can have fatal consequences for the future development of the
country.187 In particular, he rejects the argument that the common law is inherently
efficient. In his view, if courts in common law systems happen to make efficient
decisions it is because the competitive process leads judges to the correct outcome,
rather than because of any intrinsic feature of the common law.188
184 North’s statement is a personal communication to Geoffrey Hodgson and is reproduced in Hodgson
(2006, p. 19).
185 North (1990a, p. 128).
186 North (1990a, p. 58); (1981, pp. 40–41).
187 La Porta et al. (2008); Botero et al. (2004); for a critique of this approach, see Dam (2006, pp. 26–49).
188 North (1990a, p. 97).
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It is difficult to disagree with his view that legal systems are neither inherently
efficient nor inefficient. The problem, however, is that, by dismissing the efficiency
theory of the common law, he also rejects the view that law, as an institution, plays
a role in shaping political and economic outcomes. Indeed, from his perspective, it
seems that law is little more than an empty vessel performing the predetermined
function of protecting property rights and enforcing contracts. He has no interest in
the way law performs its pre-assigned function because he regards economic and
political processes as the main drivers of social outcomes.
North’s views on law have a functionalist ring about them, characteristic
among some comparative lawyers.189 They also have an affinity with the views
attributed to orthodox Marxists, who regard law as a mere epiphenomenon,
incidental to the all-important economic processes.190 Since North does not
believe that law and legal systems play a significant role in shaping the evolution
of institutions, he is not interested in examining how law accomplishes its
preordained function. Indeed, he regards law and the legal system as a ‘black
box’, designed to processes political and economic inputs, but with no internal
dynamic worthy of analysis. It is therefore not surprising that, when discussing the
evolution of the US Supreme Court’s case law in critical areas he attributes it to
changes in the subjective perceptions of judges: ‘From the Marshall Court (1801
to 1835) to the Renquist Court, the justices have interpreted and reinterpreted
essentially the same set of rules. The Court reverses itself 180 degrees over time
because the judges’ subjective modelling of the issues changes.’191 There is no
hint in this passage that he regards the Supreme Court’s changing relationship
with other organs within the Federal Government as having any bearing on the
evolution of its case law. In Violence and Social Orders, he again rejects the view
that law might have an impact on institutional development. Indeed, he flatly
dismisses the notion that the introduction of a bill of rights or the universal
franchise in a developing country would improve the chances of development.192
In this he is not restating the undisputed platitude that the enactment of legal rules
is insufficient to bring about social and economic change. Instead, his statement
suggests that he categorically dismisses even the possibility of a legal mechanism
as important as the bill of rights having an impact on the process of political and
economic development and is unaware of the significant impact of constitutional
courts on the political systems of many developing countries.193 Two prominent
examples include Colombia and South Africa, where constitutional litigation over
civil and political rights has become an important factor in the process of
institutional change.194
That North does not believe that legal structures have an impact is borne out by
what he believes is the reason behind the freedom enjoyed by US citizens. This
189 Michaels (2006).
190 Little (1986, pp. 40–67).
191 North (1990a, p. 44).
192 North et al. (2009, p. 256).
193 Ginsburg and Dixon (2011).
194 Davis (2010); Ginsburg (2012); Sieder et al. (2005).
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issue was raised by William Riker in response to a paper by Vincent Ostrom.195 In
his paper Ostrom argues that the reason why Americans enjoy freedom is because of
the institutions established by the constitution.196 Riker disagrees. In his view, the
reason why the US enjoys so much freedom is because its citizens love freedom, not
because of the merits of the constitution. Riker’s views are perfectly valid,
especially for someone sceptical about the role of institutions. Surprisingly,
however, North endorses Riker’s position.197 This endorsement is problematic
because it contradicts his key assumption that institutions matter because they shape
and influence political and economic outcomes. North does not of course deny that
law plays a role, but the role he assigns to it is minor, not dynamic. Legal
institutions are either barriers, or conduits, to secure the implementation of decisions
taken elsewhere. Thus, in his view, legal institutions have no capacity to bring about
independent outcomes. They have no autonomy: they are merely ‘black boxes’ that
respond to external economic or political inducements.
If the foregoing analysis is correct, what are the implications for North’s theory?
If law is a mechanism that performs pre-ordained functions in a mechanical fashion,
but makes no independent contribution to the pace or direction of institutional
change, why does it seem to occupy such a prominent place in North’s institutional
theory? Why is he so concerned with property rights, contract law and legal
enforcement mechanisms? The preceding analysis suggests that legal mechanisms
are forever present in his theory, but only in a supporting role. Their role is merely
to assist in the implementation of political and economic outcomes determined by
political and economic entrepreneurs. If so, where does law, as an institution, come
from? North’s answer is that law is closely related to political power and was
historically, a device to enforce the privileges of elites. In developed capitalist
democracies, the extension of the rights to all citizens came about when the elites
found it in their interest to transform their privileges into impersonal rights.198 Thus,
law’s role is limited to supplying the rules of the game. Once it has performed this
function, it fades away to become a mere organization subject to the vicissitudes of
the evolving relationship between political and economic elites. This conception is
defensible, but difficult to reconcile with his view that institutions – all institutions –
are humanly devised constraints that shape human interaction and hence impact on
economic growth.
From a socio-legal perspective, North’s approach to law and legal organizations
is ambiguous, incomplete and misleading. It is ambiguous because he regards legal
organizations as players, and, occasionally, as institutions, but does not explain how
and when such transformation occurs. It is incomplete because it focuses
exclusively on formal rules, while ignoring their impact on society. It is misleading
because its conception of law is managerial, offering an oversimplified picture of
legal and institutional change. Ultimately, his approach to law allows him to ignore
195 Riker (1976, pp. 13–15).
196 Ostrom (1976).
197 North (1990a, pp. 59–60).
198 North et al. (2009, p. 63).
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the operation of the legal process, while simultaneously proclaiming that property
and contract, albeit in purely formal terms, are relevant to economic growth.
4.3 Rule of Law Assistance
Given North’s view on the role of law in institutional change, it is pertinent to ask
where he stands on the issue of legal technical assistance of the type provided by
multilateral banks, international donors and international non-governmental orga-
nizations. Despite his scepticism about the likelihood of poor countries ever
developing efficient institutional frameworks, his work is highly regarded by
international institutions, especially the World Bank, OECD and USAID. His work
is often cited in World Bank documents, in particular Institutions, Institutional
Change and Economic Performance.199 His recent book, Violence and Social
Orders has also influenced the Bank’s analysis of state building, justice and security
in fragile states.200 In general, his work has, undoubtedly, been a major factor in
helping the Bank’s shift towards governance, prompting the development of a series
of initiatives under the motto ‘governance matters’.
North’s influence on World Bank thinking is, to some extent, surprising. Indeed,
despite supporting economic deregulation and liberalization policies, he has never
shared the simplistic assumptions associated with the original Washington
Consensus. Indeed, he has made an effort explicitly to distance himself from it in
some of his publications.201 His argument is that Washington Consensus policies
were misguided, both in their conception and in their application. They were
conceptually misguided because the promoters of the Washington consensus
assumed that the principles of neoclassical economics (‘getting the prices right’)
could be applied anywhere in the world. They applied their economic recommen-
dations without taking into account the prevailing political cultural and ideological
context, on the assumption that individuals and institutions throughout the world
would respond favourably. Thus, in North’s view, these policy recommendations
were flawed. He proposes instead that the principles of neoclassical economics
should be supplemented with a realistic, dynamic and historically accurate theory of
institutions.
North’s unequivocal dislike of state-driven policies and his strong focus on
markets have certainly contributed to boost his reputation among policy-makers at
the World Bank. Markets, in his view, require governments, but not just any
government.
There must be institutions that limit governments from preying on the
market. Solving the development problem therefore requires the crafting of
political institutions that provide the necessary underpinnings of public
goods essential for a well-functioning economy and at the same time limit
199 World Bank (2006); (1997).
200 World Bank (2011).
201 North et al. (2009, p. 271).
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the discretion and authority of government and of the individual actors
within governments.202
This statement, however, does not imply that he accepts the neoliberal project, as
embodied in the Washington Consensus. Indeed, he is especially critical of
libertarian economists, who believe that under ideal laissez faire conditions,
property rights and the rule of law can operate efficiently without the need for
adjustment. Such a view, he argues, is untenable because conditions for market
efficiency vary over time in line with changes in technology, human capital and
information costs.203
North acknowledges that today developing countries have a daunting task,
expected as they are to implement institutional changes that took Western countries
centuries to achieve.204 His theory, however, does not offer a formula for achieving
political and economic change. Accordingly he is sceptical about development
assistance being capable of resolving the economic and political problems faced by
recipient countries. This scepticism stems from his view that institutions embody
human intentionality, so neither they nor markets are natural and, hence, cannot be
expected to operate in accordance with predetermined plans.205 Nevertheless, in
Understanding the Process of Economic Change, he concludes, somewhat
gloomily, that despite the uncertainty about institutional outcomes ‘we have no
choice but to undertake social engineering’.206 While he reluctantly goes along with
piece-meal social engineering, he is, nonetheless, critical of the legal and
institutional reform programmes implemented in recent years. He emphasises that
development policies based on Western models (open access order countries)
should not be indiscriminately applied to achieve institutional improvements in
developing countries (natural states).207 Transplanting institutions modelled on
developed country institutions to developing countries is misguided because the
transplants do not generally work as expected and, worse, they can even disrupt the
social order in those countries.208
5 Conclusion
What lessons can lawyers draw from North’s theory of institutions? Why should his
work be of interest to lawyers if he regards law as a mere adjunct to economic and
political processes? This section restates some of the points developed in the paper
and considers these two questions.
202 North (2005, p. 85).
203 North (2005, p. 122).
204 North (2005, p. 120).
205 North (2005, p. 162).
206 North (2005, p. 162).
207 North et al. (2009, p. 271).
208 North et al. (2009, p. 265).
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From the perspective of law and development, North’s conceptualization of
institutions has many positive features: it regards law as an institution embedded in
society; it highlights the relevance of history for an understanding of institutional
and legal processes; it pays close attention to cultural heritage as a source of societal
norms; it acknowledges the role of belief systems in validating institutional
arrangements; it highlights the close link between political and economic processes;
it is sceptical about the benefits of imposing institutions on developing countries;
and last, but significantly, it highlights the role of individuals in the process of
institution building and institutional reform. Despite such positive features, his
theory also has shortcomings, which have been discussed in the preceding sections.
For the purpose of this section, I highlight the following: the failure clearly to
explain the provenance of institutions; the confusing distinction between formal and
informal institutions; the vague and poorly developed distinction between institu-
tions and organizations; the failure to offer a convincing explanation of the link
between economic and political processes; the disregard of dynamic features of law
as an institution; the assumption that some legal institutions, such as property and
contract, have attributes that are valid across history and cultures; and the
supposition that all societies should transit to the same end goal: the open access
order model.
Although North regards law’s role as secondary to the all-important economic
and political processes, he acknowledges that law is an originator of institutions.
Nevertheless, he does not explain the role of law and is not interested in the way
organizations work. He is only interested in macro institutional dynamics. His
theory, however, does not offer a satisfactory account of the interplay of institutions
at the macro level. Indeed, he does not take into account that institutions, especially
legal institutions, are part of a complex network of institutions and therefore
institutional and societal outcomes are rarely caused by the operation of a single
institution. This is why his views about the role of efficient property rights is
unconvincing, as confirmed by the comments of several historians and development
economists. North explains macro institutional interaction through his analysis of
the link between political and economic processes. Unable to explain this
interaction by merely aggregating the interests of individual entrepreneurs, he
builds a theory of political development that explains institutional change in terms
of an endless process of elite manoeuvring. His theory, however, does not identify
substantive economic or political factors that bring about institutional change. In
particular, it does not explain how institutions in natural states evolve to become
open access orders. Instead, his theory attributes institutional outcomes to the self-
interested behaviour of members of the elite, rather than to structural features of the
economy or polity of natural states. Thus, institutional change, if it occurs is
random, as is dependent on the subjective preferences of members of the elite.
North ignores one of the main postulates of his theory, which is that institutions
are created and destroyed by individuals, by embracing an elitist theory of politics.
Although members of the elite are individuals, they neither represent all individuals
in a particular society, nor do they act in their individual capacity when responding
strategically to the maximizing behaviour of competing coalitions of elites. It seems
ironic that a theory that claims to place individuals as the main agents in the creation
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of institutions ends up relying on a theory of collective choice that all but negates
individual autonomy. The notion that a small band of people – the elite – designs,
operates and destroys institutions is incompatible with the view that institutions are
mechanisms created by individuals.
A point of special interest for law and development scholars is the role of law in
North’s theory of political development. In natural states, law is little more than a
tool elites use to exchange privileges and control the polity. Thus, in these regimes,
law and politics are not differentiated. By contrast, in open access orders law is
transformed and converted into the familiar ‘rule of law’ prevalent in liberal
democracies. North does not, however, explain the factors that lead to this critical
transformation. Although he suggests that, at a certain stage, elites rely on legal
procedures to manage competition, he does not explain what prompts them to
choose this procedure. Neither does he explain whether this choice has an impact on
the eventual transition to an open access order. Does the transformation of law from
a blunt political instrument into an institutional framework resembling the ideals of
the rule of law have anything to do with changes taking place in the economy?
Curiously, he does not discuss this point. As a consequence, legal scholars in search
for clues as to whether particular economic policies and structures might contribute
to consolidating and expanding the role of legal institutions will not find answers in
his theory.
Absent from North’s theory is any attempt to take into account the historical
trajectory of developing countries or the problems they face today. A careful study
of the development of law and legal institutions in these states might show that legal
institutions interact with political and economic structures in complex and
interesting ways. North, however, is not interested in examining the progress of
institutions anywhere other than in successful market economies. As a consequence,
his theory has nothing meaningful to say about political and legal processes in
natural states.
Ultimately, the implicit message is that citizens in natural states can only hope
that their elites either realise that it is in their interest to develop an open legal
system or are enlightened enough to allow international agencies to design
institutions similar to those prevailing in open access orders.
In the preceding section I noted the similarities between North’s theory of
institutions and legal positivism. Relevant to the study of law in developing
countries is that both North and legal positivists share a view of institutions that
overly simplifies the concept of law. Indeed, North assumes that formally enacted
rules of the game are consistent and, in general, obeyed. His theory, however, does
not account for social relations governed by local practices. There is thus no room in
his theory for an understanding of the informal sector of the economy, prevalent in
most developing countries. Legal positivism ignores this dimension of social
relations because, from its perspective, only formally enacted rules count as law.
North also ignores it, because he considers the interpretation of conflicting social
practices as irrelevant for an understanding of macro-institutional relations. In any
event, the problem of informal law in developing countries is not easy to reconcile
with North’s distinction between institutions and organizations.
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The absence in North’s framework of any reference to the consequences of
globalization for developing countries is perhaps the single most important
omission. This is surprising since one of the factors prompting his interest in
institutions was the impact of overseas trade on polities in early modern Europe.
Given the influence of globalization on policy-making worldwide, it would seem
that any assessment of institutions in developing countries cannot disregard the
importance of global governance structures on institutions at the national level.
Although North’s attempt to produce a conceptual framework to study
institutions and economic change was not entirely successful, law and development
scholars will find in his work a wealth of insights and perspectives that will enrich
their research. It is interesting to recall that the law and development movement that
emerged in the United States in the 1960s was abruptly abandoned when its main
proponents realised that understanding the role of law in developing countries was
not as straightforward as expected. Their retreat opened the way for economists,
who, encouraged by the wave of economic globalization and political change
brought about by the collapse of the Soviet Union, began to generate facile policy
advice on how to improve legal systems and institutions in developing countries.
North did not agree with their simplistic policy recommendations. Instead, he
constructed a theory of institutions grounded in history. Although he encountered
many conceptual problems while building his theory he did not give up and
continued to refine his conceptual framework until the end of his long and
productive life.
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